February statistics indicate Germany installed a total of 211 MW. The sub-10 kW tranche again showed higher installs in 2013 compared to 2012. The medium tranches (10 kW to 500 kW) again showed lower installs but surprisingly the 1+ MW tranches (together) did better in 2013 compared to 2012. Overall, 2013's February total of 211 MW compares very favorably with the 2012 total of 230 MW.
Through February the market in Germany is showing remarkable resiliency across multiple tranches in spite of the 32 to 40% reduction in FiT rates since early 2012 - this is surely a welcome bright spot in what has otherwise been one of Europe's coldest and gloomiest winters on record.
U.K. Note
The U.K. solar market is doing well overall with over 500 MW installed in the Quarter - this is in the neighborhood of Germany's overall quarterly installation figures of 700 to 800 MW. The sub-50 kW market has failed to work its way up past 10 MW/week but give the little engine a few more weeks and things should pick up.
Sunday, March 31, 2013
Saturday, March 30, 2013
QOTD
REC is currently developing a 18 MW solar power plant in Europe at cost below 1
EUR/Watt
REC Investor Presentation - February 2013If the Europeans can do sub-Euro/Watt installs you have to figure the Chinese will be at or close to sub-Buck-a-Watt prices by the end of 2013. A Buck-a-Watt install in Tibet at 90% financing, 5% interest and a 5% discount rate delivers electricity at about 5 cents/kWh. Boom.
Thank You Sir, May I Have Another
Date | Company | Country | Event |
April, 2010 | Sunfilm | Germany | Insolvency |
June, 2010 | Signet Solar | Germany | Insolvency |
September, 2010 | Meier Solar Solutions | Germany | Insolvency |
July, 2011 | Pevafersa | Spain | Insolvency |
July, 2011 | Blue Chip Energy GmbH | Germany | Insolvency |
August, 2011 | Evergreen Solar | USA | Insolvency |
September, 2011 | Solyndra | USA | Insolvency |
September, 2011 | SpectraWatt | USA | Insolvency |
September, 2011 | Stirling Energy Systems | USA | Insolvency |
October, 2011 | Arise Technologies Deutschland GmbH | Germany | Insolvency |
October, 2011 | Gecko Group | Germany | Insolvency |
November, 2011 | Photowatt International SAS | France | Insolvency, Acquired by EdF |
November, 2011 | Xgroup Spa | Italy | Insolvency |
December, 2011 | Aleo Solar | Germany | Issues profit warning |
December, 2011 | BP Solar | England | Leaving the field |
December, 2011 | Solar Millenium | Germany | Insolvency |
December, 2011 | Solon | Germany | Germany's First Listed Solar company to file for Insolvency, Assets sold to Microsol |
February, 2012 | Energy Conversion Devices | USA | Insolvency |
March, 2012 | Ralos New Energies | Germany | Insolvency |
February, 2012 | Scheuten | Germany | Insolvency |
February, 2012 | Scheuten Solar | Netherlands | Insolvency, Assets sold to Sunways |
February, 2012 | SunConcept Holding | Germany | Insolvency |
March, 2012 | HB Solar | Germany | Insolvency |
March, 2012 | Odersun | Germany | Insolvency |
March, 2012 | Solarhybrid | Germany | Insolvency |
April, 2012 | Q-Cells | Germany | Insolvency |
April, 2012 | Solarday | Italy | Insolvency |
April, 2012 | Solar Trust of America | USA | Insolvency |
April, 2012 | Sunways | Germany | Acquired by LDK |
May, 2012 | Inventux Technologies | Germany | Insolvency |
May, 2012 | Pairan GmbH | Germany | Insolvency |
May, 2012 | Pramac | Switzerland | Insolvency |
May, 2012 | Silicio Solar | Spain | Insolvency |
May, 2012 | Solecture | Germany | Insolvency |
May, 2012 | Sovello | Germany | Insolvency |
June, 2012 | Global Solar Energy | Germany | Insolvency |
June, 2012 | Konarka Technologies | USA | Insolvency |
June, 2012 | MX Group | Italy | Leaving the field |
June, 2012 | NovaSolar | USA | Insolvency |
June, 2012 | Solarwatt | Germany | Insolvency |
June, 2012 | Solibro | USA | Sold to Hanergy for |
July, 2012 | Abound | USA | Insolvency |
July, 2012 | Amonix | USA | Announced closing of Las Vegas Factory |
July, 2012 | Centrotherm Photovoltaics | Germany | Insolvency |
July, 2012 | Gecko Group | USA | Puts Colorado CdTe Factory on hold |
July, 2012 | Schott Solar AG | Germany | Closes manufacturing plant in Albuquerque |
July, 2012 | Sunstrom | Germany | Insolvency |
August, 2012 | AQT | USA | Insolvency |
August, 2012 | Schüco International | Germany | Shuts down Großröhrsdorf plant |
September, 2012 | Miasole | USA | Sold to Hanergy for 30 million |
September, 2012 | Schüco International | Germany | Shuts down Osterweddingen plant, Exits Crystalline module manufacturing business |
September, 2012 | Solarwatt | The Netherlands | Majority takeover by Stefan Quandt |
September, 2012 | VHF Technologies/Flexcell | Switzerland | Insolvency |
October, 2012 | 3S Soluciones | Spain | Insolvency |
October, 2012 | Aleo Solar | Germany | Production partially reduced |
October, 2012 | Oerlikon Solar | Switzerland | majority takeover by Stefan Quandt |
October, 2012 | Q-Cells | Germany | Acquired by Hanwha Chemical Corporation |
October, 2012 | Schott Solar AG | Germany | Halts crystalline solar manufacturing in Germany |
October, 2012 | Siemens | Germany | Closed solar power business |
October, 2012 | Hilber Solar | Austria | Insolvency |
November, 2012 | Suntech | China | Suntech reduces production and cuts jobs at Goodyear Arizona Facility - around 50 jobs lost |
December, 2012 | JA Solar | China | Retires 300 MW of outdated cell production and 300 MW ouf outdated module production |
December, 2012 | SiC Processing AS | Norway | Insolvency |
January, 2013 | Asola Quantum Solarpower | Germany | Insolvency |
January, 2013 | Siliken | Spain | Insolvency |
February, 2013 | Innovacion en Alta Tecnologia Solar (Iatso) | Spain | Insolvency |
February, 2013 | Isofoton | Spain | Announced Restructuring |
February, 2013 | Phoenix Solar | Germany | Announced Restructuring |
March, 2013 | Suntech | China | Suntech Shuts down Goodyear Arizona Facility - 43 jobs lost - Over 100 jobs lost altogether at facility |
March, 2013 | Suntech | China | Suntech files for Insolvency |
March, 2013 | Bosch | Germany | Bosch shuts down solar division. Around 3000 jobs will be lost |
March, 2013 | HaWi Energietechnik AG | Germany | Insolvency |
March, 2013 | Solarion AG | Germany | Insolvency |
March, 2013 | Aion Renewables | Italy | Insolvency |
March, 2013 | W.Y.S.I. Sprl. (Elect-ra) | Belgium | Insolvency |
Friday, March 29, 2013
I Wonder Too
Turning Pristine U.S. Public Lands Into Solar Energy Farms
Smaller groups are still skeptical. They wonder why the administration is giving up hundreds of thousands of acres of untrammeled desert when its own Environmental Protection Agency in 2011 identified 80,000 to 250,000 abandoned mine sites on federal lands that would be suitable for large-scale solar and wind projects.
Thursday, March 28, 2013
Monday, March 25, 2013
The Fools Rule
The phone line analogy doesn't fit electricity very well. It offers up this idea of jumping from no electricity to autonomy.This idea surely came out of some TED type speech... People get all oorah on it and the meme gets out there.
I think Theaters vs. TVs is the better analogy to use with PV vs the grid. Theaters are centralized while TVs are distributed. TV started out expensive with limited offerings but got cheaper and delivered more content over time. As a result, TVs have stolen market share from Theaters but they haven't replaced them. It's reasonable to expect a similar dynamic to play out with PV vs. The Grid moving forward. The Theater vs. TV analogy has its limitations but it easily beats the phone analogy. There's a step by step process vs. the foolish leap idea.
The foolish leap idea is the thing that is sold over and over again. It's the BS idea. The shortcut. The get healthy without trying snake oil. It's been going on for hundreds of years. You'd think the communication age would make it easier to clear up the facts and get people on the same page. The opposite is true. Snake oil rules. You can perfect your eloquence all you want. The fools rule. It fucking sucks.
QOTD
"In 2009, at a time when the solar market was reeling from bloated inventories and cashflow concerns, Suntech was one of the few companies willing to brave the uncertain business conditions and invest aggressively in manufacturing capacity.
"This bold strategy resulted in Suntech's becoming the world's largest PV module supplier in 2011," he continues. "However, in retrospect, the company failed to invest in all the correct areas, specifically in wafer manufacturing. By failing to vertically integrate in this fashion, Suntech was caught in a cost squeeze between falling system, module, and cell pricing and steady wafer expenses - making the company uncompetitive."
Mike Sheppard - IHS PV Analyst
"This bold strategy resulted in Suntech's becoming the world's largest PV module supplier in 2011," he continues. "However, in retrospect, the company failed to invest in all the correct areas, specifically in wafer manufacturing. By failing to vertically integrate in this fashion, Suntech was caught in a cost squeeze between falling system, module, and cell pricing and steady wafer expenses - making the company uncompetitive."
Mike Sheppard - IHS PV Analyst
Saturday, March 23, 2013
Outtakes
TONTO: Tonto want go up dem hills.
RANGER: What's up there?
TONTO: House of many sisters by warm spring.
RANGER: How many sisters ? How... How warm?
TONTO: Seven sisters... Good warm.
RANGER: Ranger want to go there.
RANGER: What's up there?
TONTO: House of many sisters by warm spring.
RANGER: How many sisters ? How... How warm?
TONTO: Seven sisters... Good warm.
RANGER: Ranger want to go there.
Tuesday, March 19, 2013
Notes on Evolving Tariffs in China and Japan
Subsidizing solar power based on the amount of electricity generated is easier to control by the government. One-time incentives don’t give regulators much margin to ensure the quality of power plants.
Meng Xiangan, vice chairman of the China Renewable Energy Society in Beijing
Government policy is in clear support of these projects (Feed in Tariffs for large projects) while the country grapples with severe energy shortages following its shunning of nuclear power. However, this is likely to be short-lived and decline after 2014 once the current pipeline of approved projects is completed, largely because of a shortage of land in the country.
Frank Xie, IHS senior analyst for PV and solar research - commenting on Japanese market
I like the quote from Xiangan - it's clear and to the point. It would be great if the US woke up and shifted subsidies away from a front loaded (AKA: one-time) Investment Tax Credit structure. Distributing the front loaded ITC over a 10 year depreciation period for all photoelectric development (residential, commercial and utility) would accomplish this.
I like the quote from Xie as well. On one hand I don't think he goes far enough but I suppose the available land argument allows him to make his point without ruffling any feathers. In my opinion the greater reason for curtailing subsidies on mega-projects has to do with the fact that these projects never become competitive. It's better to focus deployment on residential and commercial customers who can self-consume electricity. This policy strategy has the additional benefit of encouraging the development of an energy management market which spills over into improving system efficiency.
You want a policy that gives the developer of a photoelectric system more responsibility and control over profits. The policy should evolve in stages.
1st stage. Throw money at the problem. Offer a generous FiT to get the ball rolling. Supply chains get built and/or reinforced during this stage. The market has limited information on the present and future costs of deployment. This stage of development needs to generate the info required to make people comfortable with the technology and its economics.
2nd stage. Start reducing subsidies and experimenting with self-consumption bonus policies. You'll expect system costs to fall to keep the photoelectric system profitable. Regulators can look at markets like Italy, Germany and Australia to get an idea for how fast they can reduce subsidies. Market participants can do the same. During this stage of development you can expect the installers and the industry associations to cry bloody murder when subsidies are reduced. It's all a show for the cameras.
3rd stage. You start hitting parity with retail. Keep reducing subsidies and fine tune the self-consumption policies. Restrict subsidies on utility type systems. During this state you kill off unsustainable developers.
4th stage. Transfer to value of electricity tariffs (VETs). If you've done things right you should have a large potential customer base capable of economically installing photoelectric systems and you should have plenty of information available to the market detailing the expected system costs, system performance, self-consumption rates and so on.
Meng Xiangan, vice chairman of the China Renewable Energy Society in Beijing
Government policy is in clear support of these projects (Feed in Tariffs for large projects) while the country grapples with severe energy shortages following its shunning of nuclear power. However, this is likely to be short-lived and decline after 2014 once the current pipeline of approved projects is completed, largely because of a shortage of land in the country.
Frank Xie, IHS senior analyst for PV and solar research - commenting on Japanese market
I like the quote from Xiangan - it's clear and to the point. It would be great if the US woke up and shifted subsidies away from a front loaded (AKA: one-time) Investment Tax Credit structure. Distributing the front loaded ITC over a 10 year depreciation period for all photoelectric development (residential, commercial and utility) would accomplish this.
I like the quote from Xie as well. On one hand I don't think he goes far enough but I suppose the available land argument allows him to make his point without ruffling any feathers. In my opinion the greater reason for curtailing subsidies on mega-projects has to do with the fact that these projects never become competitive. It's better to focus deployment on residential and commercial customers who can self-consume electricity. This policy strategy has the additional benefit of encouraging the development of an energy management market which spills over into improving system efficiency.
You want a policy that gives the developer of a photoelectric system more responsibility and control over profits. The policy should evolve in stages.
1st stage. Throw money at the problem. Offer a generous FiT to get the ball rolling. Supply chains get built and/or reinforced during this stage. The market has limited information on the present and future costs of deployment. This stage of development needs to generate the info required to make people comfortable with the technology and its economics.
2nd stage. Start reducing subsidies and experimenting with self-consumption bonus policies. You'll expect system costs to fall to keep the photoelectric system profitable. Regulators can look at markets like Italy, Germany and Australia to get an idea for how fast they can reduce subsidies. Market participants can do the same. During this stage of development you can expect the installers and the industry associations to cry bloody murder when subsidies are reduced. It's all a show for the cameras.
3rd stage. You start hitting parity with retail. Keep reducing subsidies and fine tune the self-consumption policies. Restrict subsidies on utility type systems. During this state you kill off unsustainable developers.
4th stage. Transfer to value of electricity tariffs (VETs). If you've done things right you should have a large potential customer base capable of economically installing photoelectric systems and you should have plenty of information available to the market detailing the expected system costs, system performance, self-consumption rates and so on.
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